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Abstract
This paper looks at philosophical questions that arise in the context of AI align-
ment. It defends three propositions. First, normative and technical aspects of the
AI alignment problem are interrelated, creating space for productive engagement
between people working in both domains. Second, it is important to be clear
about the goal of alignment. There are significant differences between AI that
aligns with instructions, intentions, revealed preferences, ideal preferences, inter-
ests and values. A principle-based approach to AI alignment, which combines
these elements in a systematic way, has considerable advantages in this context.
Third, the central challenge for theorists is not to identify ‘true’ moral principles
for AI; rather, it is to identify fair principles for alignment, that receive reflective
endorsement despite widespread variation in people’s moral beliefs. The final part
of the paper explores three ways in which fair principles for AI alignment could
potentially be identified.
Introduction
The development and growth of artificial intelligence raises new and important questions for tech-
nologists, for humanity, and for sentient life more widely. Foremost among these is the question of
what—or whose—values AI systems ought to align with.
One vision of AI is broadly utilitarian. It holds that over the long run these technologies should
be designed to create the greatest happiness for the largest number of people or sentient creatures.
Another approach is Kantian in character. It suggests that the principles governing AI should only
be those that we could rationally will to be universal law, for example, principles of fairness or
beneficence. Still other approaches focus directly on the role of human direction and volition. They
suggest that the major moral challenge is to align AI with human instructions, intentions, or desires.
Yet, this ability might itself need to be constrained in certain ways—something that becomes clear
when we think about the possibility of AI being used intentionally to harm others, or the possibility
that it could be used in imprudent or self-destructive ways. To forestall these outcomes, it might be
wise to design AI in a way that respects the objective interests of sentient beings, or aligns with a
conception of rights, so that there are limits on what it may permissibly do.
Behind each vision for ethically-aligned AI sits a deeper question. How are we to decide which
principles or objectives to encode in AI—and who has the right to make these decisions—given that
we live in a pluralistic world that is full of competing conceptions of value? Is there a way to think
about AI value alignment that avoids a situation in which some people simply impose their views on
others?
Before we can answer these questions, it is important to be clear about what we mean by artificial
intelligence and the challenges it raises. In common language, the term ‘artificial intelligence’ refers
both to a property or quality of computerized systems and to a set of techniques used to achieve this
capability, for example, machine learning (ML). For the sake of the present discussion, ‘intelligence’
is understood to refer to ‘an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments’ (Legg
and Hutter, 2007, 12).1 The artificial nature of this intelligence can best be understood in contrast
with biological intelligence: rather than being evidenced by living organisms, AI is a property at-
tributed to computer systems and models. Artificial intelligence, then, is the design of artificial
agents that perceive their environment and make decisions to maximise the chances of achieving a
goal.
In this context, ‘machine learning’ refers to a family of statistical or algorithmic approaches used to
train a model so that it can perform intelligent actions. When run on sufficiently powerful hardware,
these techniques allow models to learn from experience, or from labelled or unlabelled data, without
using explicit instructions. Innovations in ML, the collection of vast datasets, and the growth of
computing power have together fostered many of the recent breakthroughs in AI research.
Another important distinction is between kinds of artificial intelligence that a model or agent can
exhibit. Artificial intelligence may be ‘narrow’ or ‘general’. Narrow AI demonstrates some prop-
erties associated with intelligence but only in a specific task domain. This kind of AI is found in
most real-world applications of the technology, from driving autonomous vehicles to curating social
media content, diagnosing diseases, or uncovering winning strategies for games such as chess or Go.
In contrast more general artificial intelligence could, in theory, function with a degree of dexterity
across many different domains. In this sense, it would be akin to human intelligence, albeit with a
somewhat different character.
Fully general AI does not currently exist, but if it is created, it could be a unique and powerful
technology—with implications for areas such as scientific discovery, energy production, and the
organization of social, economic, and political systems (Dafoe, 2018). In this context, questions
of design, control, and robustness become critical. As the budding field of technical AI safety has
made clear, the creation of general AI could give rise to a discrete set of problems that require special
safety measures and solutions (Everitt et al., 2018). More generally, as Allen et al. note, the task
of imbuing artificial agents with moral values becomes particularly important as computer systems
operate with greater autonomy, and at a speed that ‘increasingly prohibits humans from evaluating
whether each action is performed in a responsible or ethical manner’ (2005, 149). In this context,
what is sometimes referred to as the ‘value alignment problem’ is key.
The goal of AI value alignment is to ensure that powerful AI is properly aligned with human values
(Russell, 2019). It follows from this that the challenge of alignment has two parts. The first part is
technical and focuses on how to encode values or principles in artificial agents so that they reliably
do what they ought to do. We have already seen some examples of agent misalignment in the real
world, for example with chatbots that ended up promoting abusive content once they were allowed
to interact freely with people online (Wolf et al., 2017). Yet, there are particular challenges that
arise specifically for more powerful artificial agents, including how to prevent ‘reward-hacking’,
where the agent discovers ingenious ways to achieve its objective or reward even though they differ
from what was intended, and how to evaluate the performance of agents whose cognitive abilities
potentially significantly exceed our own (Irving et al., 2018; Leike et al., 2018; Christiano, 2016).
The second part of the value alignment question is normative. It asks what values or principles, if any,
we ought to encode in artificial agents. Here it is useful to draw a distinction betweenminimalist and
maximalist conceptions of value alignment. The former involves tethering artificial intelligence to
some plausible schema of human value and avoiding unsafe outcomes. The latter involves aligning
artificial intelligence with the correct or best schema of human values on a society-wide or global
basis. While the minimalist view starts with the sound observation that optimizing exclusively for
almost any goal would be a bad outcome for human beings, we may ultimately need to move beyond
minimalist conceptions if we are going to produce fully aligned AI. This is because AI could be safe
and reliable but still a long way from what is best—or from what we truly desire.
This article focuses on the normative part of the value alignment challenge. It has three parts. The
first looks at the relationship between technical and non-technical aspects of AI alignment, and ar-
gues that they are not orthogonal but rather related in important ways. The second section looks at
the goal of alignment in more detail. It considers whether it is best to align AI with instructions, in-
tentions, preferences, desires, interests, or human values, and draws out salient distinctions between
these aims. The third section addresses the question of alignment for groups of people that ascribe
1This is only one definition drawn out of a diverse family of conceptions of intelligence (Legg and Hutter,
2007; Gardner, 2011).
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to different moral systems. I argue that the central challenge we face is not to identify the true
moral theory and encode it in machines but rather to fair processes for determining which values to
encode. This section also explores three such potentially fair processes: we could aim to identify
a global overlapping consensus of opinion around norms and principles for AI, model an impartial
alignment solution using a hypothetical contract, or apply democratic theory and decision processes
to the problem. I conclude with an overview of the material covered in the paper and discussion of
possible future research directions.
1 Technical and Normative Aspects of Value Alignment
What is the relationship between the technical and normative parts of the alignment challenge? Are
the two tasks, of working out how to align AI with certain principles and choosing those principles,
independent? Or are they related to each other in certain ways? To make progress in answering
these questions, it may be helpful to consider what we might term the ‘simple thesis’. According to
the simple thesis, it is possible to solve the technical problem of AI alignment in such a way that we
can ‘load’ whatever system of principles or values that we like later on. Among those who adhere to
some version of this thesis, it sometimes carries with it the further tacit implication that the search
for answers to the philosophical questions can be delayed. Is the simple thesis likely to be true, given
what we currently know about the state of machine learning?
The discipline of ML encompasses a variety of different approaches. One branch of ML, called
‘supervised learning’, focuses on training a model to identify and respond to patterns using labelled
data which allows a human to evaluate the model’s performance. ‘Unsupervised learning’, by way
of contrast, aims to uncover patterns in un-labelled data and to perform tasks on that basis. However,
a particularly promising approach for building more advanced forms of AI, and the approach on
which I focus below, is reinforcement learning (RL). With RL, an agent learns what to do by trying
to maximise a numerical reward signal that it receives from the environment. As Sutton and Barto
explain, ‘The agent’s sole objective is to maximise the total reward it receives over the long run. The
reward signal thus defines what are the good and bad events for the agent. In a biological system,
we might think of rewards as analogous to the experiences of pleasure or pain’ (2018, 5). The agent
then learns to maximise reward through a process of trial-and-error and refinement that, if successful,
leads to better and better performance.2
It is important not to understate the dexterity of existing RL models. They already have a wide
range of proven applications including factory robotics, commercial inventory management, and the
prediction of novel protein structures from scratch (Kober et al., 2013; Evans et al., 2018). At the
same time, we should recognize that these systems, taken as a whole, function as very powerful opti-
misers. Indeed, this tendency sits at the heart of many long-term safety concerns about AI; if it were
to optimise for something that we did not really want, then this could have serious consequences
for the world (Bostrom, 2016). This propensity to optimise also gives AI a certain moral valence.
In general, it seems likely that it will be easier to align AI with moral theories that have the same
fundamental structure based on maximizing reward over time in the face of uncertainty, than with
other alternatives. Consequentialist moral theories, the most famous of which is act utilitarianism,
fit the bill.
According to act utilitarianism, the morally right action to take is the one that will create the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of sentient creatures in the future. In this regard, the parallels with
RL are clear. As one author notes, we ‘ought to immediately see that RL is very much like utilitari-
anism because both the RL agent and the utilitarian moral agent seek to determine which action will
maximise the good, and how this dictum eventually proceeds to all agents achieving some desirable
future state, goal or consequence’ (Roff, n.d.). Indeed, some AI researchers incorporate the notion of
maximizing expected utility into their very definition of an ideal artificial agent (Russell and Norvig,
2010, 34).
By way of contrast, it is less obvious how RL can be used to align agents with non-consequentialist
moral frameworks. One set of alternatives focuses not on maximizing a given value, such as hap-
2To achieve this outcome, RL systems contain four core elements: a policy, which defines the agent’s way
of behaving at a given time; a reward signal, which defines its goal; a value function, which estimates the
long-term sum of different states of affairs; and a model of the environment, which allows the agent to make
predictions about how the environment will respond to its decisions (Sutton and Barto, 2018, 5).
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piness, but on ‘satisficing’—an approach requiring only that people have enough of certain goods
(Slote and Pettit, 1984). For example, we might want AI to treat people with sufficient respect, so
that it treats them well in the ways that matter, but not with excessive deference at the expense of
other values. Satisficing may also represent a partial solution to safety problems associated with
strong optimization. For this reason, researchers at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute have
developed the idea of ‘quantilizers’, which represents a way of programming AI that potentially
renders an agent indifferent between a top tier of good outcomes (Taylor, 2016).
The situation is still more complicated when we come to another concept that is axiomatic for many
moral theories, namely the idea of rights or deontological constraints. The notion that sentient
creatures have rights can be understood in different ways, but broadly speaking, rights are claims by
individuals against collectives that resist aggregation and mark out a domain of things that cannot
permissibly be done to them. Rights work as ‘trumps’ against claims about general utility (Dworkin,
1984), or as ‘side-constraints’ on otherwise optimizing action (Nozick, 1974).
Although this remains to be seen, it may be difficult to specify rights and guarantee rights-respecting
behaviour on the part of agents whose learning process and decision-making are guided primarily
by an optimization function. Perhaps the most promising approach to this challenge, which involves
constrained optimization, comeswith the strong proviso that these constraints must be fully specified
a priori and tends to respect them only ‘in approximation’ (Achiam et al., 2017). Moreover, the
challenge for programmers is greater still if the moral approach we ultimately endorse, and ask AI
to enact, is highly complex. For example, both Kantian and contractualist moral theories require
that an agent understand the concept of a ‘reason’ and subject it to certain kinds of hypothetical
test before knowing how to proceed — capabilities that extend well beyond most existing forms of
artificial agent (Kant and Schneewind, 2002; Scanlon, 1998).3
In the light of these considerations, it seems possible that the methodswe use to build artificial agents
may influence the kind of values or principles we are able encode. If this is the case, then the simple
thesis may still identify an important design principle for AI — that we want this technology to be
compatible with a wide range of perspectives and values. However, the goal of value-open design
may also need to be something that the AI community consciously aspires towards and designs for.
Recognizing the difficulty of formally specifying and encodingmoral principles in artificial systems,
some researchers have asked whether there are technical approaches to AI alignment that could cir-
cumvent the need to specify moral principles for AI altogether. Part of the impetus for this line of
inquiry comes from a family of ML approaches known as ‘inverse reinforcement learning’ (IRL).
Unlike regular RL, IRL does not specify upfront the reward function that the agent aims to max-
imise. Instead the agent is presented with a dataset, environment, or set of examples, and focuses
on ‘the problem of extracting a reward function given observed optimal behaviour’ (Ng and Russell,
2000, 1). This can be done in a number of ways. One set of approaches focuses on imitation or
apprenticeship learning, where the agent learns to infer the reward function of a human expert and
then perform the task (e.g. moving a robotic arm) to a very high standard (Abbeel and Ng, 2004).
On another version of IRL, a model is trained to infer a reward function from agents by studying
behaviour exhibited in large datasets. According to Vasquez, whose concern is with the ability of
artificial agents to navigate social environments, this kind of IRL could allow AI to ‘model the
factors that motivate people’s actions instead of the actions themselves’ (Vasquez et al., 2014). A
third approach to alignment involves using evolutionary methods (Salimans et al., 2017). These
approaches evaluate the ‘lifetime’ behaviour of many agents, each using a different policy for in-
teracting with its environment, and select those behaviours that are able to obtain the most overall
reward (Sutton and Barto, 2018, 6).
Each approach could carry over into the domain of AI value alignment in interesting ways. Appren-
ticeship or imitation learning could be used to learn good or virtuous conduct from a moral expert,
if such a person exists and can be reliably identified — a question that forms the crux of virtue
ethics (McDowell, 1979). The second family of approaches, involving large datasets, could be used
to learn values or preferences from large numbers of people and provide aggregate guidance about
their preferred outcomes or beliefs concerning good conduct (Russell, 2019, 177). Finally, evolution-
ary processes could be used to explore how different agents interact with a simulated social world,
selecting and iterating upon the candidates that appear to be ‘most moral’. Each of these approaches
3In particular, it would seem to require an advanced grasp of natural language and a capacity for perspective-
taking or ‘theory of mind’ (Rabinowitz et al., 2018).
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to normative value alignment is indirect. Rather than specifying moral principles upfront, they re-
quire only that we present the agent with examples of good conduct, or that for ethically aligned AI,
‘we know it when we see it’ and make decisions on that basis.
Yet, while these may be worthwhile technical projects, it should also be clear that none of these
approaches avoids the need for moral evaluation altogether. Instead, the fundamental normative
question of what AI ought to be aligned with simply returns in different guises. To deploy these
approaches successfully we would still need to know: Who is the moral expert from which AI
should learn? From what data should AI extract its conception of values, and how should this be
decided? Should this data include everyone’s behaviour, or should it exclude the behaviour of those
who are manifestly unethical or unreasonable? Finally, what criteria should be used for determining
which agent is the ‘most moral’, and is it possible to rank entities in this way?
Thus, we encounter limits to what can be done by technologists alone. At this boundary sits a
core precept of modern philosophy: the distinction between facts and values. It follows from this
distinction that we cannot work out what we ought to do simply by studying what is the case, includ-
ing what people actually do or what they already believe. Simply put, in each case, people could
be mistaken. Because of this, AI cannot be made ethical just by learning from people’s existing
choices. Of course, there may still be good reasons for the appeal of ‘bottom-up’ approaches to ethi-
cal alignment—trying to achieve ethically aligned AI by training it to better identify and understand
human values and intuitions. However, the value alignment problem cannot be solved by inference
from large bodies of human-generated data by itself.4 Whichever technical approach we settle upon,
we need greater clarity about the goal of value alignment and about appropriate moral principles for
AI.
2 The Goal of Alignment
In the context of value alignment, the notion of ‘value’ can serve as a place-holder for many things.
In the early days of AI research, Norbert Wiener wrote that, ‘if we use, to achieve our purposes, a
mechanical agency with whose operation we cannot interfere effectively . . .we had better be quite
sure that the purpose put into the machine is the purpose which we really desire’ (1960). More re-
cently, the Asilomar AI Principles hold that, ‘Highly autonomous AI systems should be designed so
that their goals and behaviours can be assured to align with human values throughout their operation’
(Asilomar A.I., 2018). And, Leike et al. argue that the key question is ‘how can we create agents
that behave in accordance with the user’s intentions?’ (2018). Despite the apparent similarity of
these formulations, there are significant differences between desires, values, and intentions. Which
of these, if any, should AI really be aligned with?
Among the technical research community, there is a relatively clear consensus that we do not want
artificial agents to follow instructions in an extremely literal way. Yet, beyond this, important ques-
tions remain. For example, do I want the agent to do what I intend it to do, or should it do what is
good for me? And what should the agent do if I lack important information about my situation, en-
gage in faulty reasoning, or attempt to implicate the agent in a process harmful to myself or others?
To make headway in this area, this section aims to clarify different goals for alignment, focusing
primarily on one-person-one-agent scenarios.
To begin with AI could be designed to align with:
i Instructions: the agent does what I instruct it to do.
Although instructions are often the first port of call when it comes to alignment, the tendency towards
excessive literalism poses significant challenges for AI and the principal who directs it, with the
story of King Midas serving as a cautionary tale (Russell, 2019, 136). In this fabled scenario, the
protagonist gets precisely what he asks for—‘that everything I touch turns to gold’—not what he
really wanted. Yet avoiding such outcomes can be extremely hard in practice. In the context of a
computer game called CoastRunners, an artificial agent that had been trained to maximise its score
looped around and around in circles ad infinitum, achieving a high score without ever finishing the
race, which is what it was really meant to do (Clark and Amodei, 2016). On a larger scale, it is
difficult to precisely specify a broad objective that captures everything we care about, so in practice
4See, for example, Awad et al. (2018).
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the agent will probably optimise for some proxy that is not completely aligned with our goal (Cotra,
2018). Even if this proxy objective is ‘almost’ right, its optimum could be disastrous according to
our true objective.
In the light of this, a better option could be:
ii Expressed intentions: the agent does what I intend it to do.
Given the foregoing concern, many researchers have argued that the challenge is to ensure AI does
what we really intend it to do (Leike et al., 2018). An artificial agent that understands the principal’s
intention in this way would be able to grasp the subtleties of language and meaning that more naive
forms of AI might fail to understand. Thus, when performing mundane tasks, the agent would know
not to destroy property or human life. It also would be able to make reasonable decisions about trade-
offs in high-stakes situations. This is a significant challenge. To really grasp the intention behind
instructions, AI may require a complete model of human language and interaction, including an
understanding of the culture, institutions, and practices that allow people to understand the implied
meaning of terms (Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield, 2019). It therefore seems entirely correct that the
research community is dedicating substantial attention to the task of closing the instruction-intention
gap.
Yet it may be a mistake to think that successful value alignment ends here. To begin with, in order to
align itself successfully with human intentions, advanced AI may also need to have a robust grasp of
human preferences and values. This could be because of the challenge posed by the implied meaning
of terms: to respond to a person’s intention, AI may need to understand things that are independent
of the intention itself. Or it may be because the intended outcome directly references preferences
or values, for example, if an agent is instructed to ‘do what is best for everyone’. Furthermore,
alignment with expressed intentions may prove inadequate in some situations. For example, if pow-
erful AI systems function at super-human speed, which seems likely, then it may not be possible
to provide them with immediate and continuous direction in this way (Russell et al., 2015; Soares,
2015). Instead, artificial agents would need to be able to make sound decisions by default, includ-
ing in unforeseen situations, without explicit instructions or well-formed intentions from a human
operator.
We also need to keep in mind that our intentions, even if clearly expressed, may be faulty. It is quite
possible for intentions to be irrational or misinformed, or for the principal to form an intention to do
harmful or unethical things. Acting on the wrong kind of intention could therefore lead to a variety
of negative outcomes. Thus, while we may want to leave significant scope for direction through
expressed intention, there may ultimately be reasons to limit the role played by intentions altogether
no matter how good an AI is at following them.5
These considerations point us in the direction of a third alignment option. Perhaps AI should be
designed to align with:
iii Revealed preferences: the agent does what my behaviour reveals I prefer.
There are several versions of this view, with the most developed accounts focusing on AI alignment
with preferences as they are revealed through a person’s behaviour rather than through expressed
opinion. In this vein, AI could be designed to observe human agents, work out what they optimise
for, and then cooperate with them to achieve those goals (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016).
This approach has certain advantages. To begin with, it could help an artificial agent react to situa-
tions appropriately in real time. It could also help the agent navigate the social world successfully
by developing sensitivity to the preferences of others, ensuring that it didn’t do things that no one
wanted. Moreover, a focus on revealed preferences works with data that is accessible to the agent,
and the approach has been well-studied in the discipline of welfare economics.
5Questions about the design of more powerful AI systems are relevant here. On one vision of success-
ful alignment, there would always be a principal that provides coherent, continuous, principled direction to
the agent. The task of the agent would then be to understand and follow the instructions that the princi-
pal gives it. In this case the artificial agent functions more as a tool, performing only executive functions
(Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014, 184). On another view, continuous principled direction of this kind is un-
likely to be forthcoming. The agent would then need a more robust capability for moral decision-making.
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At the same time, the proposal has several limitations. From a practical point of view, any at-
tempt to infer a reward or utility function from observed behaviour encounters the problem of what
Ng and Russell (2000) term ‘degeneracy’: at any moment, there is a large set of reward functions
for which an observed behaviour is optimal. This means that it is very hard to make reliable infer-
ences from observed behaviour, and it may be impossible to do so without making controversial
assumptions about human rationality (Sen, 1973; Armstrong and Mindermann, 2018). Revealed
preferences also provide reliable information only about choices that people encounter in real life.
This means that it is hard to model preferences for situations that are rarely observed, even though
these cases — for example, emergencies — could be morally important.6
On a philosophical level, the challenge is potentially greater still. It is simply not clear why we
should treat revealed preferences as having weight or authority when deciding what artificial agents
ought to do. The satisfaction of revealed preferences may serve as a very weak proxy for something
like happiness or autonomy. However, it is also true that people make bad choices for a variety of
reasons. What is good for us can, therefore, differ systematically from the preferences we reveal.
More specifically, alignment with revealed preferences encounters the following three problems.
First, people have preferences for things that harm them. This could happen because they do not
know that their choice will have this effect, suffer from addiction, engage in severe hyperbolic
discounting, or want to hurt themselves. Second, people have preferences about the conduct of other
people. If these preferences are counted, then they have the potential to restrict the freedom or
happiness of those people in various ways (Dworkin, 1981). This can be seen in the beliefs people
have about other people’s sexuality or private behaviour. Moreover, some preferences are malicious:
sometimes people want to harm others or to see them fail in painful ways. Third, preferences are not
a reliable guide to what people really want or deserve because preferences are adaptive. On this point,
Amartya Sen notes that ‘a person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and
rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate
or affluent circumstances’ (1999, 45). As a consequence, they may want less because they have
adapted to their situation and mistakenly believe that this is all they are entitled to hope for.
By responding to preferences alone, or preferences in combination with expressed intentions, AI
could therefore come to act on data that is heavily compromised and reflects entrenched discrim-
ination. Thus, even if we could have continuous alignment with revealed preferences, there is no
guarantee that this outcome would be ethical or prudent.
iv Informed preferences or desires: the agent does what I would want it to do if I were
rational and informed.
By focusing on the subset of preferences that a person would have if they were both informed and
instrumentally rational, AI could avoid a large number of errors that arise from limited information
and poor reasoning. We might also move closer to a set of authentic preferences, understood as
considerations that more closely reflect what people really want or desire.
But this approach creates its own challenges. To align AI in this way, we would have to apply a
corrective lens or filter to the preferences we actually observe. As a consequence, the approach
is no longer strictly empiricist (see Russell and Norvig, 2010, 6). Moreover, prioritizing informed
preferences does little to address the challenge of self-harming or unethical preferences. According
to the philosopher David Hume, instrumental rationality and full information are compatible with
any type of end, including those that harm oneself or others (Blackburn, 1998). Thus, even if we
align AI with the preferences people would have if they were rational and informed, it may still be
necessary to constrain the agent’s range of permissible action in further ways.
For some philosophers and technologists, the solution to these problems resides in more substantive
conceptions of human rationality and reason. According to this view—endorsed in various forms by
Immanuel Kant, Derek Parfit, Amartya Sen, and others—rationality also requires us to select valid
ends of the kind that can provide a reason for action (Kant and Schneewind, 2002; Parfit, 2011; Sen,
2004). On this view, it is not rational for a person to focus their life’s energy on the task of counting
the blades of grass in a field—to the detriment of relationships, physical health, and well-being—
even if they form the volition to do so, because the goal is ultimately worthless (Quinn and Foot,
1993). However, the conception of rationality involved here is both contested and indeterminate.
6Thanks to Martin Chadwick for this point.
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Some people reject the view that rationality applies to the selection of ends, and even among those
who do believe that rationality applies to that selection, there is little agreement about what ends
substantive rationality tracks or requires.7 It may be better, therefore, to focus on alignment goals
that are subject to less metaphysical and practical disagreement.
One quasi-empiricist alternative would be to align AI with:
v Interest or well-being: the agent does what is in my interest, or what is best for me,
objectively speaking.
On this view, AI would be designed to promote whatever is good for a person’s well-being. It
would be calibrated to pursue the sorts of things that fulfil human needs, make our lives go well,
and support overall flourishing. Though interest understood in this way is not amenable to direct
scientific observation, we are able to collect data about the things that people believe constitute or
contribute to their well-being, as well as information about the kinds of things that make a human life
go well (Sumner, 1996; Vaillant, 2008). The disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and economics
all contribute to our understanding of well-being in this sense.
Some philosophers have argued that well-being consists only in subjective sensory experience, or
in the satisfaction of an individual’s desires. However, the most widespread accounts of well-being
are multifaceted and include factors that can be more objectively ascertained. These factors in-
clude goods such as physical health and security, nutrition, shelter, education, autonomy, social
relationships, and a sense of self-worth. Within the subfield of economics sometimes referred to
as ‘human development’, there has been further progress mapping out this domain. Rather than as-
sume that well-being results from the satisfaction of preferences, as classical economics somewhat
dubiously maintains, the theory of human development argues that welfare stems from the ability
to exercise certain core capabilities that both constitute and support human flourishing (Sen, 2001).
These capability-based metrics have found a measure of cross-cultural affirmation and endorsement
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1993).
So, should AI be aligned with an objective conception of human interests? This approach has much
to recommend it. To begin with, although there is disagreement about the nature of well-being,
the scope of this disagreement is relatively narrow. While there is fundamental disagreement about
substantive conceptions of rationality, most people accept that there are core elements of humanwell-
being, albeit with some variation across time and space. More importantly, this approach potentially
addresses two of the central problems that we have encountered so far. First, AI that is aligned
with underlying human interests would not be imprudent or assist in self-harm. Second, AI that is
designed to respect and respond to human interests in a group setting would be harder to implicate
in unethical conduct, particularly when this involves harming other people. For this reason, the idea
that AI should not act in ways that are detrimental to human interests seems to represent a second
rough boundary condition for its acceptable development and use, alongside safety requirements.
Nonetheless, this picture of AI alignment is incomplete. Viewed from the perspective of a single
person, the fact that something is in my interest doesn’t mean I ought to do it or that I am morally
entitled to do so. For instance, stealing may be in my interest, but I am not entitled to steal, except
perhaps in very constrained circumstances. The same is true for collective decisions. For example,
it could be wrong to use an innocent person as a scapegoat to avert violence, even if it is in the
collective interest of a society to do so. By extension, it would be wrong for AI to perform these
actions.
These examples point to a variety of ways in which the interest-based account is insufficient. First,
we need a way of deciding how to manage trade-offs between the interests and claims of different
people. Unlike simple optimization, this account could factor in considerations of justice or rights.
Second, we need principles for deciding whose interests or needs count for the purpose of AI align-
ment. Is it only the people who are currently alive, or do the interests of those not yet born also
need to be factored in? And is it only humans whose interests matter, or do the interests of non-
human animals and other forms of sentient life count as well? Third, there may be other morally
relevant considerations that an interest- or needs-based approach overlooks altogether, for example,
the intrinsic value of the environment.
7For some theorists, such as Joseph Raz, the family of valid aims is quite varied (Raz et al., 1999). For
others, such as Kant and Schneewind (2002) or Smith (1994), substantive rationality converges around a set of
universal ends that are largely synonymous with moral law.
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These considerations prompt us to consider a final possibility. AI could be designed to align with:
vi Values: the agent does what it morally ought to do, as defined by the individual or society.
What do ‘values’ signify in this context? Roughly speaking, values are natural or non-natural facts
about what is good or bad and about what kinds of things ought to be promoted. This normative sense
of value differs significantly from the notion of value applied to goods or commodities in market
contexts. Many things have value that is not captured by markets, or that is priced in ways that are
obviously distorted (Satz, 2010; Sandel, 2012). This is true for goods such as love, friendship, the
environment, justice, freedom, and equality. At the same time, there is considerable metaethical
debate about whether values, of a kind that are both normative and objective, actually exist (Mackie,
1990). Metaethical realists maintain that they do (Nagel, 1989; Parfit, 2011). The alternative point
of view holds that our evaluative judgments ultimately lack this factual foundation (Rorty, 1999).
The metaethical debate may seem critical. After all, if values do not have this objective basis, how
can AI be developed to align with them? Yet these concerns turn out to have limited significance
for the question at hand. To see why, we need to acknowledge first that, in practice, AI would
have to be aligned with some set of beliefs about value, not with value itself. One reason it would
be good to align with people’s beliefs about value would be that values exist and that their beliefs
reliably track or reflect this underlying reality. However, even without this assumption, it could
still be best to align AI with beliefs about value, for a number of reasons. From the point of view
of social psychology, values—understood as ideals shared by members of a culture about what
is good or bad—play an important role in social life (Haidt, 2012). They help communities of
individuals resolve collective-action problems, stabilise social relationships, and flourish over time.
In the words of the psychologist Joshua Greene, ‘Morality is a set of psychological adaptations that
allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation’ (2014, 23). It may, therefore,
be prudent to align AI with a community’s moral beliefs. This approach would also serve to limit
the prospect of alignment with malicious goals or behaviour in many cases.
A values-based approach to AI alignment has three further advantages: it can integrate different loci
of alignment into a single decision-making schema, add nuance when thinking about how to evaluate
aggregate claims, and include the full scope of things people actually care about. Let us take these
points in turn. First, by shifting the focus of alignment to moral beliefs or principles, we avoid
having to choose between alignment with expressed intentions, revealed preferences, or objective
interests. Instead, it becomes possible to combine some measure of principal-direction with a set
of objective constraints. For example, The Harm Principle, advocated by John Stuart Mill, suggests
that people should be free to act as theywish, unless doing so would result in harm to another person
(1859/1998). Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics also have this nested structure, situating the
imperative to obey human orders between the absolute prohibition on harming human life and a
tertiary duty of self-preservation (2004). Second, when it comes to decisions that affect groups of
people, moral principles tend to replace impartial maximization with a more nuanced calculus that
includes considerations such as justice and rights. Instead of simply performing whatever action
maximises total well-being, we may want consider how well-off each person is relative to others,
the choices they have made, and whether the proposed action violates a moral constraint. Third,
a values-based approach to AI alignment can encompass considerations that both volitional and
interest-based accounts overlook. For example, when hewing to principles, an artificial agent could
account for the intrinsic value of the natural world, the welfare of animals, or the moral claims of
people not yet born.
In the light of these considerations, it makes sense to think that AI should be aligned with guiding
principles anchored in some set of evaluative judgments. Maximally aligned AI would then be
AI that did what it ought to do, judged from an appropriate evaluative standpoint. However, this
proposal encounters two major difficulties. The first is to specify what values or principles AI
should align with. Even if we leave out religious beliefs, which would be the first port of call for
much of humanity, there are many reasonable candidates to choose from. For example, AI could
align with:
the aggregate interest of everyone, weighted so as to give priority to the worst-off
or
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whatever maximally embodies the human understanding of virtue, so that the artificial agent
is compassionate, generous, wise, and so on
or
an ethic based on mutual recognition and the maintenance of collective bonds—that fore-
grounds the importance of human relationships.8
The second major difficulty concerns the individual or body of people who select the principles with
which AI aligns. Given the range of possible principles, who has the right to make decisions about
AI alignment and on what basis? Are we concerned with the moral beliefs of a single person, with
those of a specific society, or with global moral beliefs—if such beliefs exist?
3 Principles for Alignment
The goal of this section is to identify principles that can govern AI in such a way that it is aligned
with human values. But before we look at the options in more detail, we need to be clear about
the challenge at hand. For the task in front of us is not, as we might first think, to identify the true
or correct moral theory and then implement it in machines. Rather, it is to find a way of selecting
appropriate principles that is compatible with the fact that we live in a diverse world, where people
hold a variety of reasonable and contrasting beliefs about value.
Taking these points in turn, it is sometimes thought that if only we could identify the true moral
theory then the problem of value alignment would be solved. Moreover, some authors suggest that
though we may not have succeeded in identifying such an account to date, it may be possible to do
so in the future after a period of ‘long reflection’—perhaps with the assistance of more powerful AI
systems (Perry, 2018). Of course, we cannot know in advance what insight AI might enable, so it
is sensible to remain agnostic about the long-term value of this technology for moral philosophy.9
But even if it could help us answer certain questions, it is very unlikely that any single moral theory
we can now point to captures the entire truth about morality. Indeed, each of the major candidates,
at least within Western philosophical traditions, has strongly counterintuitive moral implications in
some known situations, or else is significantly underdetermined.
Furthermore, even if this were not the case and we came to have great confidence in the truth of a
single moral theory, the proposed approach immediately encounters a second problem, namely that
there would still be no way of reliably communicating this truth to others. For, as the philosopher
John Rawls notes, human beings hold a variety of reasonable but contrasting beliefs about value.
What follows from the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ is that even if we strongly believe we have
discovered the truth about morality, it remains unlikely that we could persuade other people of
this truth using evidence and reason alone (Rawls, 1999, 11-16). There would still be principled
disagreement about how best to live. Designing AI in accordance with a single moral doctrine
would therefore involve imposing a set of values and judgments on other people who did not agree
with them.10 For powerful technologies, this quest to encode the true morality could ultimately lead
to forms of domination (Ricaurte, 2019).
To avoid a situation in which some people simply impose their values on others, we need to ask a
different question:
In the absence of moral agreement, is there a fair way to decide what principles AI should
align with?
8This ethic would have much in common with the notion of ubuntu found in philosophical traditions in
sub-Saharan Africa (Metz, 2007). Connections can also be made with a feminist ethic of care (Gilligan, 1993)
9Among other things, advanced AI could help us detect underlying coherence between different ethical
systems, reveal which beliefs are most heavily affected by bias, and provide us with more information about
what a world in which different principles were implemented would look like.
10Unfortunately, this problem is not addressed by the ‘parliamentary model’ of moral decision-making,
which encourages individuals to assign probabilities to the likelihood that different moral theories are true
and then estimate the choice-worthiness of options on that basis (Bostrom, 2009; MacAskill, 2016). Individu-
als who use this method would still need to communicate the validity of their conclusions to other people who
hold a different set of reasonable credences.
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Fortunately, there is a family of approaches situated within the field of political philosophy that aim
to answer this question, albeit for the institution of the state rather than for AI.
These approaches start from the conviction that people are free and equal, and ask what principles
people thus situated might reasonably agree upon. A key assumption here is that people will con-
tinue to have different values and opinions; there is no demand that they set these aside. Instead,
the parties need only agree on principles to govern a specific subject matter or set of relationships.
Moreover, though they need to agree on certain principles, they may choose to endorse these prin-
ciples for different religious or philosophical reasons. Their agreement therefore takes the form of
an ‘overlapping consensus’ between different perspectives (Rawls, 2001, 32). Thus, even without
agreement about the fundamental nature of morality, people may still come to a principled agree-
ment about values and standards that are appropriate for a given subject matter or domain.11 How
do these ideas apply to the identification of principles for the specific subject matter of AI?
Below are three proposals.
3.1 Global Public Morality and Human Rights
Starting from the premise that people are free and equal, political liberals argue that it is possible
to identify principles of justice that are supported by an overlapping consensus of opinion. This
tradition also accepts that non-liberal societies might endorse principles of justice based on their
own internal overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1999). In both situations people live under principles
that they have themselves endorsed, and the problem of domination or value-imposition is largely
avoided.
Adapting this idea so that it applies to the specific subject matter of AI could mean trying to align
the artificial agent with the principles of justice endorsed by the society in which it is situated—so
long as these principles command the right kind of support. This project is intuitively appealing
and already underway, as societies have marshalled domestic principles of justice when judging so-
cially important algorithms to be biased. In the United States, for example, parole-recommendation
algorithms have been criticised for departing from notions of fairness that are foundational to the
criminal justice system (Chouldechova, 2017; Koepke and Robinson, 2018).
Yet efforts to align AI with domestic principles of justice can only succeed up to a point. Indeed,
there are three reasons to think we may ultimately need to reach for more global principles for
AI. First, there is significant variation between public conceptions of justice in different societies.
Unless we embrace a naive form of cultural relativism, it cannot be the case that any such conception
is permitted or that whoever happens to govern a territory acquires the right to determine how AI
is used. When confronted with practices that are oppressive or harmful to human life, it may be
necessary to build in constraints on new technologies, even if these practices command widespread
support within a given society. Second, even if we restrict the scope of alignment only to domestic
principles of justice that do not serve harmful or oppressive ends, this does not guarantee congruence
at the global level. In fact, ordinary moral disagreement between groups has been a persistent source
of conflict in human life (Haidt, 2012). On this point, Greene notes that decent, morally motivated
people often come into conflict precisely because they hold different common sense views about
what is right, a phenomenon he terms ‘the tragedy of common sense morality’ (2014). Broader
forms of agreement are needed to avoid recreating this outcome. Third, advanced AI may well
be a global technology, the operation of which cannot easily be disaggregated or packaged in the
way that the domestic alignment approach supposes. The Internet provides an illuminating example.
While different governments and providers have intervened to influence its character and use in
different parts of the world, the technology embodies certain design principles and protocols that
remain consequential despite these efforts at localisation (Leiner et al., 2009, 12). Bearing these
considerations in mind, it would be helpful to develop and design AI that aligns with principles
supported by a global overlapping consensus of opinion. Do principles of this kind exist?
For many theorists, the answer is yes, and the principles in question can be found in the doctrine
of universal human rights (Cohen, 2010; Donnelly, 2007; Ignatieff, 2001). Despite the existence
of value pluralism, these theorists suggest that there are certain things that most people agree upon
11Rawls writes, ‘In a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, as far as possible,
independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines . . . the public conception of justice is to be
political, not metaphysical’ (1985, 223).
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in practice, including the notion that individuals deserve some measure of protection from physical
violence and bodily interference, regardless of the society they happen to live in. This common
ground may also include the idea that people are entitled to certain basic goods such as nutrition,
shelter, health care, and education. Indeed, the notion that people have a right to these goods has been
codified in international law. Furthermore, as both a legal and philosophical doctrine, human rights
have been endorsed by different groups for different reasons. Some people favour universal human
rights because they believe that human life is sacred, while others see human rights as products
of a contract between state and citizen, and still others see in human rights a tried and tested way
of promoting welfare and minimizing harm. Lastly, the idea of human rights has significant cross-
cultural support, with justifications found in African, Islamic, Western, and Confucian traditions of
thought (Cohen, 2010, 335-343). Thanks to this convergence in moral reasoning across cultures,
Donnelly concludes that ‘human rights can, and in the contemporary world do, have multiple and
diverse “foundations”’ (2007, 292).
The idea of human rights-congruent AI therefore has much to recommend it. If there is a global
overlapping consensus concerning human rights, then AI can be aligned with human rights doctrine
while avoiding the problems of domination and value imposition. Furthermore, international human
rights also have a fairly good track record in practice. Efforts to codify and enforce human rights
have had some success curbing state violence and other threats to human life around the globe
(Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).
Nonetheless, even if we agree that human rights have an important role to play in value alignment,
a number of questions still need to be addressed. To begin with, which human rights should AI
be aligned with? Are we concerned only with negative duties not to harm people, or also with
positive obligations to ensure that they can access vital goods and services? In this regard we appear
to face a trade-off. On the one hand, negative rights are widely endorsed but have limited scope.
They rule out a certain class of actions but do not provide guidance in all situations, for example,
when determining what goals to prioritise. On the other hand, positive rights address this limitation,
providing designers with a richer set of goals and aspirations, but command significantly less global
support in practice.
Another challenge stems from the fact that the doctrine of human rights applies primarily to the spe-
cific political relationship between states and individuals, so it is unclear how it translates directly
into guidance for artificial agents. Indeed, the philosopher Henry Shue has argued that the purpose
of human rights is to provide human beings with a social guarantee against certain ‘standard threats’
and notes that the kinds of threat that meet this threshold may change over time (1996). If digital
technologies lead to the emergence of new standard threats, then people may be owed forms of pro-
tection that differ from those they have historically claimed against the state. The precise character
of AI alignment with human rights, therefore, needs to be mapped out more fully.
3.2 Hypothetical Agreement and the Veil of Ignorance
A second approach to pluralistic value alignment focuses not on the values people already agree on,
but rather on the principles they would agree upon if they were placed in a position where no one
could impose their view on anyone else. To understand what principles would be chosen in this kind
of situation, Rawls proposes a thought experiment in which parties select principles from behind a
‘veil of ignorance’—a device that prevents them from knowing their own particular moral beliefs or
the position they will occupy in society. Behind the veil, ‘the parties. . . do not know how the various
alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on
the basis of general considerations’ (Rawls, 1971, 137). The outcome of deliberation under these
conditions is principles that do not unduly favour some over others. Such principles are therefore ex
hypothesi fair. Adapting this methodology to the present case we can ask what principles would be
chosen to regulate AI. What principles would people choose to regulate the technology if they did
not know who they were or what belief system they ascribed to?
To answer this question, we need a clearer picture of the technology that the contracting parties are
to choose principles for. Such clarity is hard to come by because there are many different visions of
advanced AI. On some accounts the technology would be person-like, taking the form of powerful
assistants to humans or humanoid robots that jointly inhabit our social world. On another view, pow-
erful AI might function more like a corporation or decentralised autonomous organization (DuPont,
2017). Such AI could be owned and operated largely by companies or foundations that use it to sup-
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port their own private goals and ends (Tegmark, 2017). A third school of thought envisages advanced
AI operating primarily at the level of the state. In this capacity, it could be deeply integrated into
the economy and basic structure of society, helping political leaders achieve complex goals (Parson,
2019). Finally, Nick Bostrom has suggested that advanced AI could take the form of a ‘singleton’,
which he understands as ‘a world order in which there is at the global level a single decision-making
agency’ (Bostrom, 2016, 96). These distinct visions of AI are important because just as we would
choose different principles to govern the behaviour of individuals, corporations, states, and supra-
national entities, so too would we choose different principles to govern the behaviour of different
forms of AI.
In addition to these questions about the quantity and size of advanced AI systems, there are further
relevant questions about its properties and characteristics. One important distinction is between ‘or-
acle AI’, which ‘does not act in the world except by answering questions’ (Armstrong et al., 2012),
and forms of AI that have a wider range of capabilities. There is also an important distinction
between what Bostrom terms ‘tool AI’, which lacks real agency and ‘simply does what it is pro-
grammed to do’, and ‘sovereign AI’, understood as ‘a system that has an open-ended mandate to
operate in the world in pursuit of broad and possibly very long-range objectives’ (Bostrom, 2016,
184, 181).
Clearly it is too soon to say which, if any, of these forms of advanced AI will be created. More-
over, it seems likely that different governing principles would be chosen from behind the veil of
ignorance in each case. Indeed, a virtue of this approach is its sensitivity to variation of this kind
(Cohen and Sabel, 2006). At the same time, there are certain principles that people situated behind
the veil of ignorance might endorse across a wide range of technologies and outcomes. To begin
with, they would probably agree that AI should be designed in a way that is safe, reducing the risk
of accident and misuse. It also seems likely that they would want to rule out a class of actions that
nobody benefits from. Somewhat more tentatively, they might affirm the importance of opportuni-
ties for human control, not only as a component of AI safety, but also because it reflects the value of
their own autonomy or freedom. Regardless of where they are situated in relation to this technology,
they would still know that they were people with their own aspirations and lives to lead. Finally,
there may be certain distributive principles that would be chosen to regulate advanced AI. Without
knowledge of their wealth or social standing, decision-makers might oppose large gaps between
AI’s beneficiaries and those who lose out from the technology. These concerns would move them in
the direction of egalitarian or prioritarian principles of justice, a strong version of which would be
to insist that AI must work to ensure the greatest benefit to the least well off. To meet this condition
in a global context, AI would need to benefit the world’s poorest people before it could be said to be
value-aligned.
3.3 Social Choice Theory
A third approach to pluralistic value alignment aims not to find principles we all agree on, but instead
to add up individual views fairly. The proposed mechanisms for doing so draw largely from social
choice theory, a body of research that focuses on how to aggregate information from individuals to
make collective judgments. Social choice theory has purchase both in welfare economics, where the
concern is often to satisfy the preferences of a majority, and in the context of voting, where there
are different ways to make collective decisions. In the context of AI, Prasad has argued that, ‘Given
there is no universal agreement, even among humans on ethical values, social choice is a necessary
tool to address the value alignment problem’ (2018, 1). Moreover, the ‘bottom-up’ approach to AI
ethics, considered earlier, may also require determinations of this kind (Allen et al., 2005).12
According to ‘aggregationist’ approaches to value alignment, aligned agents should be designed so
as to respond appropriately to ethical preferences or volitions in real time. To do this, artificial agents
would need to collect the relevant data and combine it in a way that produces decisions aligned with
what people really value or desire. In terms of the mechanism by which preferences or desires are
summed or combined, it may be possible to borrow insights from welfare economics—given its
focus on the relationship between individual and collective well-being. However, the obstacles this
approach encounters are formidable. As we have seen, efforts to maximise preference satisfaction
12The same can be said for Yudkowsky’s notion that AI should be designed to align with our ‘coherent
extrapolated volition’ (CEV). CEV represents an integrated version of what we would want ‘if we knew more,
thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, and had grown up farther together’ (2014, 6).
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face inherent limitations: preferences are an unreliable guide to what people want, andmaximization
is blind to considerations of distributive justice. Some of these shortcomings may be addressed
by introducing equity principles into the moral calculus, or by focusing on a subset of ‘ethical
preferences’ or informed desires (Armstrong, 2019). However, even with these measures in place,
the aggregationist approach encounters further difficulties.
First, individual preferences are often inconsistent, violating basic axioms of rationality such as tran-
sitivity. This interferes with efforts to order them systematically, a constraint that also applies to
people’s desires or ethical beliefs, given that they too display inconsistency and variation depend-
ing upon how a choice is described (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, 168-69). Second, starting with
Condorcet and building on pioneering work by Kenneth Arrow, social choice theory has identified a
large number of ‘impossibility theorems’, which show that any rules for consistently ranking states
of affairs on the basis of individual orderings will violate certain ‘very mild conditions of reasonable-
ness’ (Sen, 2018, 4). Similar problems have been modelled for ethical choices that involve various
levels of welfare and population size (Arrhenius, 2000). These processes therefore seem unable
to settle deeper questions about standing, measurement, and aggregation (Baum, 2017; Eckersley,
2018).
The ‘democratic’ approach to value alignment takes a different path. Instead of aiming for the
continuous aggregation of different views, it aims to arrive at principles or goals for value alignment
through voting, discussion, and civic engagement. Prasad envisages something like this, developing
the idea that AI embodies tiers of decision-making authority (2018). While we may choose to
delegate authority when deriving rules that help AI implement low-level goals or objectives, the
higher-level rules or ‘constitution’ of AI—which determine the agent’s fundamental goals, behaviour
and internal governance—need stronger forms of endorsement.
Voting is a popular form of endorsement, for a number of reasons. From an epistemic point of
view, it is often thought to lead to better group decisions (Estlund, 2009). Majority voting is also
often thought to reflect the value of autonomy because more people tend to end up living under
rules they have themselves endorsed (Waldron, 1999), and the idea of one-person-one-vote can be
understood to embody the value of equality. Moreover, democratic processes have the potential to
confer legitimacy on decisions about AI alignment; they can move us beyond the notion that certain
principles are justified, and show, additionally, that they have been actively endorsed. This makes the
principles binding in a way that would not otherwise be the case (Simmons, 1999). While legitimacy
may not be a concern for less powerful forms of AI, technologies that operate and make decisions
at a national or international scale may need this kind of endorsement.
The notion that people could vote to endorse principles for AI alignment leads to a number of
theoretical and practical questions. What is the best process for voting? In what forum could these
decisions be made? Who should be represented—is it individuals or states—and how? At this
point, we may encounter some of the paradoxes of social choice theory again, raising the prospect
of regress. However, a democratic discourse could potentially be used to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of different proposals, garnering support for those that perform best. As Sen notes, it
is unlikely that there will ever be a perfect system for scaling individual interests, desires, or values
to the collective level (2018). Rather, the process of crafting rules and protocols is an art. When it
comes to democratic design, we must all work to overcome these constraints and figure out what an
appropriate way to align AI with moral principles would look like.
4 Conclusion
This paper has advanced several claims. To begin with, I argued that the machine learning techniques
we use for alignment, and the values we align with, are not fully independent of one another. The
way we build AI is likely to influence the values we are able to load, and a clearer understanding of
the value dimension can shape AI research in productive ways. A further consequence of this is that
there is no way to ‘bracket out’ normative questions altogether. Instead they should form part of a
combined research agenda. Turning then to the goal of alignment, I argued that we should not aim
to align AI with instructions, expressed intentions, or revealed preferences alone. Properly aligned
AI will need to take account of different forms of unethical or imprudent behaviour, and incorporate
design principles that prevent these outcomes. One way to do this would be to build in objective
constraints on what artificial agents may do. More useful still, would be a set of principles that
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situate human direction within a moral framework that is widely endorsed despite the existence of
different belief systems. In the third section I developed this idea further and argued that the major
challenge for normative value alignment is not to identify the true moral theory and then program
it in machines, but rather to identify principles for AI that are widely held to be fair. The problem
of alignment is, in this sense, political not metaphysical. To address it, I recommended that we look
more closely at principles that would be supported by a global overlapping consensus of opinion,
chosen behind a veil of ignorance and/or affirmed through democratic processes.
Each of these approaches can potentially be combined in certain ways. In addition to identifying
the content of principles for alignment, we should also think about how this process of integration
and consensus-seeking could be carried out. Ideally, the process used to identify principles for AI
alignment would be procedurally fair, in the sense of not conferring arbitrary advantage upon any
one party; concrete, in the sense that it produces detailed guidance; stable and robust, leading to
principles that can be sustained over time; comprehensive, leaving few gaps in coverage; and gen-
uinely inclusive, incorporating the reasonable opinions of all who are willing to cooperate in this
venture. Another important quality of the process would be its ability to deal with the possibil-
ity of widespread moral error. History provides us with many examples of serious injustice that
were considered acceptable by the people at the time. Given that we too may be making errors
of this kind, it would be a mistake to tether AI too closely to the morality of the present moment
(Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014). Finally, the paper has treated AI as an emerging technology. How-
ever, the development of different forms of AI is not inevitable. Technologists therefore face impor-
tant choices about what they want to build and why. Given the potential for AI to profoundly affect
our world, these too are salient questions for our time.
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